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THE NORTH CAROLINA GIFT OF SECURITIES
TO MINORS LAW-ITS FEDERAL TAX
IMPLICATIONS
J. CARLTON FLEmiNG*
In 1955, North Carolina, along with seven other states, followed the
suggestion of the New York Stock Exchange in adopting a statute sim-
plifying the procedure for making gifts of securities to minors.' The
North Carolina enactment, styled the "Gift of Securities to Minors
Law' 2 unquestionably provides a useful vehicle for transferring certain
types of securities. In addition, it presents interesting possibilities for
the minimization of Federal taxes through shifting of income within a
family group.
In general, the new law provides that a valid transfer of registered
securities may be made to a minor simply by registering them in the
name of any adult member of the minor's "family, ' 3 or in the name of
any guardian of the minor, followed by the words "as custodian, for
(name of minor)." 4 Securities in bearer form may be
transferred by delivery to any adult member of the minor's family (other
than the donor) to any guardian of the minor, accompanied by a deed
of gift duly acknowledged, in substantially the form set forth in the
statute.5 A very liberal definition of the term "security" permits the
application of the new provisions to most categories of intangible per-
sonal property."
*Attorney at Law, Charlotte, North Carolina.
I Almost identical statutes were adopted by Georgia, California, Colorado, North
Carolina, New Jersey, Connecticut, Ohio and Wisconsin. P-H 1955 Fed. Tax
Serv., f1 34,302, 34,360.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-68 to N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-74 (Supp. 1955).
' The term "family" includes the minor's parents, grandparents, brothers, sisters,
uncles and aunts, whether of the whole blood or the half blood, or by or through
legal adoption. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-69 (d) (Supp. 1955).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-70 (1) (a) (Supp. 1955).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-70 (1) (b) (Supp. 1955).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-69 (a) (Supp. 1955): "The term 'securities' or 'se-
curity' shall include any note, stock certificate, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, whiskey warehouse receipt, evidence of indebtedness, transferable cer-
tificate of interest or participation, certificate of interest in a profit-sharing agree-
ment, any instrument representing any interest or right in or under any oil, gas
or mining lease, fee or title, or rights or interests in land from which petroleum or
minerals are, or are intended to be produced, certificate of interst in an oil, gas
or mining lease, collateral trust certificate, any transferable share, investment con-
tract, or beneficial interest in or title to property or profits or any contract or agree-
ment in the promotion of a plan or scheme whereby one party undertakes to pur-
chase the increase or production of the other party from the article or thing sold
under the plan or scheme, or whereby one party is to receive the profits arising
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G. S. 33-70 (2) provides that a gift made in the prescribed manner
shall be irrevocable and shall convey to the minor indefeasibly vested
legal title to the securities, and that a guardian shall have no rights with
respect to such securities unless the guardian is also the custodian. 7
The custodian is required to collect the income from the securities
held by him and to apply all or part of such income and all or part of
the principal, as he deems advisable, for the support, maintenance, edu-
cation and benefit of the minor.8  "To the extent that property held by
the custodian and the income thereof is not so expended, it shall be de-
livered or paid over to the minor upon the minor's attaining the age of
twenty-one years, and in the event that the minor dies before attaining
the age of twenty-one years it shall thereupon be delivered or paid over
to the estate of the minor."9
By far the most important provisions of the new law appear in G. S.
33-71, relating to the rights, powers and duties of the custodian. The
custodian has authority to sell, exchange, convert or otherwise dispose
of any and all of the securities held by him in such manner and at such
time or times, for such prices and upon such terms as he may deem
advisable. He has the power "in his sole and absolute discretion to
retain any and all securities delivered to him within the meaning and
under the authority of this Section without reference to the Statutes
relating to permissible investments by fiduciaries."' 0  He is required
to "invest the minor's property in such securities as would be acquired
by prudent men of discretion and intelligence who are seeking a reason-
able income and the preservation of their capital without reference to
the Statutes relating to permissible investments by fiduciaries. . .. "I'
from the increase or production of the article or thing sold under the plan or
scheme, or any other instrument commonly known as security."
In application, however, the new law is not quite so comprehensive as the
definition of a "security" would suggest. Mechanics are provided only for the
transfer of securities in "registered form" or in "bearer form." The usual prom-
issory note payable to a named promissee or his order is not in "bearer form"
nor is it considered to be in "registered form" unless "its terms specify that its
transfer may be registered upon books maintained for that purpose by or on be-
half of an issuer." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-69 (b) (Supp. 1955). It is doubtful
that a brokerage account containing, for examining, corporate stocks would qualify
as a "security." A conservative approach would dictate transfer of the securities
held in such an account rather than of the account itself.
' There is a slight ambiguity in this section which arises from the language of
the draftsman that the minor shall have title "to the securities thus delivered."
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-70 (1) (a) (Supp. 1955), which prescribes the manner of
making gifts of securities in registered form does not require delivery.8 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-71 (1) (a) (Supp. 1955).9 Ibid.
"o N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-71 (1) (b) (Supp. 1955). Query whether, in the
traditional "hard case" a court may not feel constrained to superimpose some
standard of conduct, perhaps a prudent man rule? In any event, liability on the
part of the custodian would arise in cases of his "bad faith or intentional wrong-
doing." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-71 (3) (Supp. 1955).
'
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-71 (1) (b) (Supp. 1955).
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He may vote any securities held by him. In short, he enjoys the rights
and powers bestowed upon trustees under many liberal trust agreements.
His clerical duties are not burdensome.. Accounting is required only
upon petition to the superior court by the minor after attaining age
twenty-one, a parent or legal representative of the minor, or a successor
custodian. He cannot be required to account more than one year after
delivery to the minor after he has attained age twenty-one, or to the
estate of the minor.1
2
A custodian who is not compensated for acting as such is not re-
quired to give bond for the faithful performance of his duties and "shall
not be liable for any losses to the property held by him except such as
are the result of his bad faith or intentional wrongdoing or result from
his investing the minor's property in a manner other than as prescribed
in G. S. 33-71 (1) (b). 13
The protective provisions for brokers, transfer agents and issuers
are exceedingly broad, stating, inter alia, that "no issuer of securities,
transfer agent, registrar or bank or other person acting on the instruc-
tions of any person purporting to be a custodian or donor shall be re-
sponsible for determining whether any person has been duly designated
as a custodian under this Article ..... -14
Its sponsorship by the New York Stock Exchange15 indicates that
the new law is a product of the incompatibility of the needs of com-
merce and the laws heretofore governing the property of minors. As in
the case of many enactments prompted by commercial expediency, there
may be those who will find the common law somewhat unyielding.
Among them may be the custodian who finds in the literal words of
the statute authority to retain any security transferred to him, and the
broker, who, also relying on the literal expressions of the statute, ac-
cepts the instructions of one who unconvincingly purports to be a cus-
todian.
FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAX
A problem which has often perplexed practitioners seeking to ar-
range transfers for the benefit of minors is the fear that the annual ex-
clusion provided under the federal gift tax laws may be lost by virtue
of a gift being held a transfer of a "future interest."'16 Section 2503 (c)
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-73 (Supp. 1955).
if N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-71 (3) (Supp. 1955). It is not clear whether a
"retention" of property transferred to a custodian is considered an "investment"
by the custodian in connection with his liability for unauthorized investments.
U N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-71 (1) (d) (Supp. 1955).
' See note 1 supra.
x' See Caplin, How to Treat Gifts to Minors, Proc. NYU 13TH ANN. INST.
ON FED. TAXATION 193 (1955) ;* Diamond, Tops and Dolls or Gifts to Minors, 30
TAXES 987 (1952). Section 2503(b), 1954 Code, provides for a recurring annual
exclusion of the first $3000 of gifts to one person, "in the case of gifts (other
19561
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of the 1954 Code, which provides that certain transfers for the benefit
of minors shall not be considered gifts of future interests, is clearly
applicable to gifts under the Gift of Securities to Minors Law, thereby
qualifying such gifts for the annual exclusion.17
There would appear to be no occasion for the inclusion of property
transferred under the Gift of Securities to Minors Law in the taxable
estate of either the donor or the custodian, except in the event of a
"transfer in contemplation of death" by the donor within the three-year
period ending with his death.' 8
FEDERAL INCOmE TAX
If a father were to establish a trust for his minor child, providing
that the income could be used for the support of the minor child, or
accumulated in the trustee's discretion, there could be no doubt that at
least that portion of the income actually used for support would be
taxable to the father.19 Moreover, should the father reserve certain
"administrative powers" such as the power to direct in a non-fiduciary
capacity the voting of stock of a corporation in which the holdings of
the grantor and the trust are significant from the standpoint of voting
control, all the income of the trust would be taxable to him under
Setcion 675 (4), 1954 Code.
It is quite clear that, in enacting the Gift of Securities to Minors
Law, the General Assembly has, in effect, provided fathers with a ready-
made trust instrument adequate for many purposes. The custodian has
ample powers of administration over the securities he holds, as well as
full authority to apply the principal and income for the benefit of the
minor, or to accumulate income, in his discretion.
Is it possible that by making use of a custodianship under the new
than gifts of future interests in property) . . . ." In effect, the amount becomes
$6000 in the case of a gift by a husband or wife whose spouse consents under
Section 2513.
"7 Section 2503(c), 1954 Code: "TRANSFER FOR THE BENEFIT OF MINOR.-No
part of a gift to an individual who has not attained the age of 21 years on the date
of such transfer shall be considered a gift of a future interest in property for pur-
poses of subsection (b) if the property and the income therefrom-(1) may be expended by, or for the benefit of, the donee before his attaining
the age of 21 years, and
(2) will to the extent not so expended-(A) pass to the donee on his attaining the age of 21 years, and
(B) in the event the donee dies before attaining the age of 21 years, be
payable to the estate of the done or as he may appoint under a general power of
appointment as defined in section 2514 (c)."
Moreover, it is not at all unlikely that the Treasury Department would hold a
transfer under the new law a gift of a present interest in line with the principles
stated in Revenue Ruling 54-400, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 319 (1954), which liberalized
previous official opinion on the subject.
"8 Section 2035, 1954 Code. Estate tax provisions not considered applicable
are Sections 2031, 2033, 2034, and 2036-2044, 1954 Code.
" Section 677, 1954 Code.
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law, the father can avoid the income tax he would otherwise have to pay
if he were the grantor of a trust designed to perform the same func-
tions? Obviously, a conclusive answer cannot be given. No case has
yet considered the status of a statutory custodian. Yet, a consideration
of the cases involving outright transfers, guardians and brokerage ac-
counts on the one hand, and the rationale of the decisions in the trust
cases, on the other, casts considerable light on the problem. The roles
of application of income for support of minor children and of control
in the donor or grantor merit particular attention.
There are a signficant number of cases holding that, where a trust is
not utilized, income from property transferred to a minor will be taxed
to the minor and not to the donor, even though the donor retains a large
measure of control over the property transferred. Thus in A. N. Mc-
Quown20 a father transferred undivided interests in road building ma-
chinery to each of this three children. Thereafter, the father, as agent
for the children, rented the machinery to himself and other contractors,
exercising control over the rental equipment and collecting the income
for the benefit of the children. The Tax Court held the income to be
that of the children and not of the father. "The. appointment of pe-
titioner, a donor, to manage the equipment was not fatal. ' ' 21 Similarly,
income from cattle, grazing and wheat land owned by a minor has been
held to be taxable to the minor rather than his donor-father despite
"managerial control" by the father while his son was away at school.22
Where the minor's property is held by his guardian (even though
the father has often been both donor and guardian) the courts have
been unanimous in applying the dictum of the United States Supreme
Court in Freuler v. Helvering2 3 that "the whole of a minor's income
received by his guardian is taxable to the minor irrespective of its accum-
ulation in the guardian's hands, distribution to the minor or payment for
his support or education."24
The Tax Court has considered a number of cases involving gifts
of securities to minors by means of transfers to a brokerage account
managed by an adult. Perhaps the high-water mark was Emil Frank
25
in which the petitioner and his wife made gifts of securities to brokerage
accounts managed by the petitioner for the benefit of their three daugh-
ters, all of whom were minors. Substantial amounts of the income were
applied to their support, maintenance and education. Nevertheless, the
1o P-H 1953 T. C. Memo. Dec., § 53,204 (1953).211d. at 606-53.
"Alexander v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 753 (5th Cir. 1951).23291 U.S. 35 (1934).
2
,R. E. Martin, P-H 1944 T. C. Memo. Dec., § 44,013 (1944) ; H. C. Priester,
33 B. T. A. 230 (1935), nonacq. XIV-2 Cum. Bull. 39. See Van Wart v. Com-
missioner, 295 U. S. 112 (1935).2z 27 B. T. A. 1158 (1933).
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Tax Court held that the income was attributable to the separate prop-
erty of the minors, and was not taxable to their father. In Edward H.
Heller26 a father managed brokerage accounts for his minor children.
The accounts contained securities transferred by the father and others,
but none of the income was applied for support. Although the father
had designated himself "trustee" in opening the accounts, the entire in-
come of the accounts was held to be taxable to the minors and not to the
father, as a trustee or individually. To like effect are Reginald Fincke,2 7
Herbert L. Dillon2s and Prudence Miller Trust.29
Although the Emil Frank line of authority has been neither over-
ruled nor limited by holdings in subsequent cases, dictum in Daniel J.
Fry,30 holding a purported transfer to minors not to be a completed
gift, hinted that the Tax Court might no longer find them persuasive.
"Petitioner places some reliance upon a group of cases in which it was
held that a parent was not required to include in his gross income the
profit resulting from operating brokerage accounts in the name of his
minor child or children. Emil Frank, 27 BTA 1158; Herbert L. Dil-
lon, 32 BTA 1254; H. C. Priester, 33 BTA 230. See, however,
Harry F. Canelo, 41 BTA 713 (appeal, C. C. A., 9th Cir., dismissed)
where the duties incumbent upon a parent under such circumstances
are discussed at length. All of the cases were decided prior to the
Clifford, Griffiths, Eubank, and Horst cases cited at the beginning of
this opinion. Whether they have lost any of their value as precedents
need not now be decided."'3 1 It should be noted that Edward H. Heller
adverted to the Clifford decision, but did not consider it applicable.8 2
Five years after the appearance of the Daniel J. Fry dictum, the Tax
Court distinguished, but did not suggest disapproval of its decision in
Emil Frank.33
The dictum was ignored when, in 1954, the Tax Court decided Clay
H. Brock,34 an interesting example of family benevolence in which the
petitioner, an adroit trader in commodities, established separate trading
accounts with a broker in the names of two minor daughters, two
brothers, two sisters, and two nephews. He made deposits in each ac-
20 41 B. T. A. 1020 (1940).
27 39 B. T. A. 510 (1939).
2- 32 B. T. A. 1254 (1935).
20 7 T. C. 1245 (1946), acq. 1947-1 Cum. Bull 3, involving a transfer by a grand-
father to his son and daughter-in-law as tenants in common, accompanied by a
letter stating that the securities were being given to his grandchildren.
304 T. C. 1045 (1945).
3' 4 T. C. 1045, 1052. The cases referred to in the quotation are: Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940) ; Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 355 (1939) ;
Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112
(1940).
241 B. T. A. 1020 (1940).
'
3 Ludwig Bendix, 14 T. C. 681 (1950).12"2 T. C. 284 (1954).
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count under an agreement with the account owner that profits would be
used first to repay to the donor the amount of the deposit, but that there-
after gains and losses would be shared equally. The entire income of
the accounts prior to repayment of the deposits was held taxable to the
donor on the ground that the income was attributable to, his "labor" and
capital. However, it was held that after the advances had been repaid,
one-half the profits retained in each account were property of the ac-
count owner and the donor was taxable only to the extent of the re-
maining half. Thus, although the donor had full trading control, and
two of the accounts were established for his minor children, he escaped
taxation on all income which, under the agreements, was payable to
account owners. There was no finding on the application of income for
support. The Tax Court cited no authority for holding half the income
taxable to account owners rather than the donor.
As previously pointed out, the grantor of a trust used to support his
minor children would be taxable under Section 677, 1954 Code, or, if he
retained the proscribed administrative powers, under Section 675 (4).
These sections, however, apply only to grantors of trusts. Since the
Internal Revenue Service as well as the courts recognize clearly the
distinction between a trust and a common-law custodianship,3 5 is the
Commissioner left without statutory basis for holding income taxable
to a donor-custodian?
Strangely enough, although most of the cases holding the grantor of
a support trust taxable on its income cite Section 167 of the 1939 Code
and corresponding sections of prior law which are substantially similar
to Section 677 of the 1954 Code,3 6 the fountainhead for the proposition,
"Rev. Rul. 55-469, 1955 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 30 at 34 (1955) ; Prudence Miller
Trust, 7 T. C. 1245 (1946), acq. 1947-1 Cum. Bull. 3 (1947).
" Section 677, 1954 Code: "INcomE FOR BENEFIT OF GRANTOR.
(a) General Rule.-The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion
of a trust, whether or not he is treated as such owner under section 674, whose
income without the approval or consent of any adverse party is, or, in the dis-
cretion of the grantor or a non-adverse party, or both, may be-
(1) distributed to the grantor;(2) held or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor; or
(3) applied to the payment of premiums on policies of insurance on the life
of the grantor (except policies of insurance irrevocably payable for a purpose
specified in section 170 (c) (relating to definition of charitable contributions)).
This subsection shall not apply to a power the exercise of which can only affect
the beneficial enjoyment of the income for a period commencing after the expira-
tion of a period such that the grantor would not be treated as the owner under
section 673 if the power were a reversionary interest; but the grantor may be
treated as the owner after the expiration of the period unless the power is re-
linquished.
(b) Obligations of Support. -- Income of a trust shall not be considered taxable
to the grantor under subsection (a) or any other provision of this chapter merely
because such income in the discretion of another person, the trustee, or the grantor
acting as trustee or co-trustee, may be applied or distributed for the support or
maintenance of a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally -obligated to support or
maintain, except to the extent that such income is so applied or distributed. In
1956] "213
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Douglas v. Willcuts,37 relied on the statutory definition of "gross in-
come." Although Douglas v. Willcuts has been cited as holding that
Section 167 of the 1939 Code requires that a grantor be taxed with
the income of a trust which discharges his legal obligations,38 a careful
reading of the opinion of the Supreme Court indicates that its decision
rested solely on the application of the term "gross income." 3 Thus, it
does not suffice to say that Sections 677 and 675(4) cannot apply to a
custodianship. The father must also escape what the Supreme Court
has termed the "sweeping scope" 40 of the statutory definition of "gross
income."'41
Those who felt that Congress had properly laid to rest the Clifford42
doctrine when it provided in Section 671 of the 1954 Code that a grantor
could not be taxed "solely on the grounds of his dominion and control
over the trust under section 61 (relating to definition of gross income)
or any other provision of this title" except in accordance with the spe-
cific statutory rules contained in Sections 671-678, may well witness its
resurrection. Although the Commissioner can no longer make use of
the statutory definition of gross income in taxing grantors of trusts, the
donor in a custodianship presumably remains fair game. Surely the
Commissioner could find comfort in many of the hundreds of decisions
handed down during the fourteen year tenure of the Clifford doctrine.43
Too much has been written of the Clifford puzzle to justify a further
summary of decisions. However, a consideration of a few of the cases
is essential to any attempt to project the probable course of judicial
thought relating to the taxation of a donor-custodian. It has been cor-
cases where the amounts so applied or distributed are paid out of corpus or out of
other than income for the taxable year, such amounts shall be considered to be an
amount paid or credited within the meaning of paragraph (2) of section 661 (a)
and shall be taxed to the grantor under section 662."
"296 U. S. 1 (1935).
38 Commissioner v. Mortin, 108 F. 2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1940).
" The Court held the grantor taxable under Section 213 of the Revenue Act
of 1926, 44 STAT. 9, and Section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 STAT. 791,
both of which were statutory definitions of gross income, and forerunners of
Section 22(a) of the 1939 Code and the corresponding Section 61 of the 1954
Code, note 41 infra.
" General American Investors Company, Inc. v. Commissioner, 348 U. S. 434(1955).
4 Under the 1954 Code, the definition of gross income appears in Section 61,
which provides that "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income
means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the
following items: ...."
"Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940), holding the grantor of a trust
taxable under Section 22(a) of the 1939 Code.
" Many authorities are of the opinion that at least one decision is available to
support almost any proposition under the Clifford doctrine and that therefore
Clifford decisions hold little precedent value. Greenberger, Changes in the Income
Taxation of Clifford Type Trusts, PRoc. NYU 13TH ANN. IxsT. oN FED. TAx-
ATION, 165, 166 (1955) ; Eisenstein, The Clifford Regulations and the Heavenly
City of Legislative Intention, 2 TAx L. Rxv. 327, 332 (1947).
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rectly stated that the Clifford case turned on four factors: (1) the
length of the term of the trust, (2) the identity of the trustee, (3) the
identity of the beneficiaries, and (4) control.44  In Clifford itself the
fact that the grantor retained a reversion after a relatively short-term
trust was found to be most persuasive. In cases involving no reversion-
ary interest in the grantor, the Tax Court has held that control over
investments alone does not bring the grantor of a trust for his children
within the Clifford rule.45 A donor under the Gift of Securities to
Minors Law has no reversion, since the securities held by the custodian
are transferred outright to the beneficiary at age twenty-one, or to his
estate in the event of death during minority.46  In the absence of a
reversion, is it possible that the element of control alone is sufficient
to result in taxation of the donor?
Since in most instances where the North Carolina Gift of Securities
to Minors Law is utilized, tax appeals would be heard by the Court of
Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, the decisions of that Court are of particu-
lar interest. In Hash v. Commissioner47 a husband and wife each
owned a one-half interest in a partnership which operated a furniture
store and a finance company. The husband transferred one-half of his
interest in trust for one of his daughters, and the wife made a similar
transfer for the benefit of the other daughter. The trustees of the
husband's trust were the wife and their attorney, while the husband
and the attorney acted as trustees under the wife's trust. The trustees,
the husband and the wife entered into a partnership agreement. The
Fourth Circuit, relying on the fact that control of the business re-
mained in the husband and wife, held the income to be taxable to the
respective grantors. There was no mention in the opinion of the
length of the trust, or of the father's duty to support. However, from
the opinion of the Tax Court below" it is clear that the grantor had
no reversion, and that none of the income of either trust was applied
for support of the children. The dissent by District Judge Coleman,
sitting in the absence of Chief Judge Parker, emphasizes that the case
turns solely on the issue of control over the property held in trust: "To
uphold the Tax Court in the present cases would be tantamount to say-
ing that a parent cannot, without continuing to pay income taxes as
" Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Section 22 (a); The Evolution of the
Clifford Doctrine, 51 YALE L. J. 213.
" B. H. Klein, 14 T. C. 687 (1950); Glenn S. Allen, Sr., P-H 1944 T. C.
Memo. Dec., 1 44,014 (1944).
0 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-71 (1) (a) (Supp. 1955). A parent or other relative
who makes such a transfer may have a valuable expectancy neverthless in view
of the inability of the minor to dispose of his property by will. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-1 (Supp. 1955).
" 152 F. 2d 722 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied; 328 U. S. 848, rehearing denied
328 U. S. 879 (1946).
48 Rose Mary Hash, 4 T. C. 878 (1945).
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though the property were still in fact his own, give property, by a deed
of trust no matter how absolute, to a child so long as the parent himself
is one of the trustees, if-even though in the exercise of honest, business
judgment the trustees feel that they can thereby best preserve and in-
crease the child's trust estate-they invest the trust corpus in a business
in which the father himself is interested and has invested his own money
because he considers it a sound investment. '49
The Fourth Circuit continued to emphasize control as a decisive
factor in Stanback v. Robertson.50 Fred and Thomas Stanback were
partners in Stanback Company, a partnership which manufactured Stan-
back Headache Powders and other products and held real estate and
securities. In 1937, the investment assets were transferred to a corpora-
tion. The operating business continued under a new partnership agree-
ment. Each brother established separate trusts for his wife and minor
children with a bank and the other brother as trustees. To each of these
trusts, each brother transferred shares of stock in the corporation and a
six percent interest in the partnership. Under the new partnership
agreement, the brothers were general partners and the trustees limited
partners. By reason of the control of the partnership (rather than the
trust) the Court held the income from the partnership taxable to the
grantors. Apparently the Commissioner had not contended that the
income from the corporation was taxable to the grantors, although
a similar measure of control would seem to be present. It is interesting
to note that the Tax Court had considered the same trusts for two
previous taxable years and had held the grantors not taxable in a de-
cision from which the government did not take an appeal. 5'
A recent Fourth Circuit decision resting primarily on the presence
of the control factor is Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v.
Yoke. 52 There the grantor created five substantially identical trusts,
with himself as trustee, for the benefit, respectively, of four nephews
and a sister, none of whom were owed a duty of support. The grantor
retained broad powers of management and control, could add income to
principal or invade principal. The corpus of each trust would eventually
be distributed to the beneficiary unless the beneficiary died during the
grantor's lifetime, in which case the trust estate would revert to the
grantor. The district court held the income of the trusts taxable to the
grantor. The Fourth Circuit agreed. "The significant factors in the
pending case in support of the District Court's decision are that Wolf
had no need for the income from the trusts, that the beneficiaries were
,9 152 F. 2d 722, 725 (4th Cir. 1945).GO 183 F. 2d 889 (4th Cir. 1950).1 Wachovia Bank and Trust Company and Fred J. Stanback, Trustees, P-H
1944 T. C. Memo. Dec., § 44,217 (1944).
" 204 F. 2d 410 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied 346 U. S. 898 (1953).
[Vol. 34
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his closest relations, that he named himself as trustee and endowed him-
self in this capacity with full power of control and management, including
the right to sell the property at any price he might determine, the right
to reinvest the proceeds in any property he might think desirable, the
right to rent the property for terms of any duration, and the right to
borrow money and secure the loan by mortgage of the property; in other
words, as he expressed it in the trust instrument, the right to manage,
control and distribute the trust estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries
as if the property were absolutely owned by him.'"' Although the
Court's decision was bolstered by the presence of a reversion in the
grantor, unquestionably it considered the control factor as most con-
vincing.
It can be concluded from the foregoing cases that, at least in the
Fourth Circuit, a grantor who reserves to himself, as trustee or other-
wise, a substantial measure of control over the corpus of the trust runs
a strong risk of taxation. Yet a father who makes an outright transfer
of machinery54 or land5 5 to his child, or a transfer of property to himself
as guardian for his child,56 or a valid transfer of securities to a broker-
age account for his child5 7 has usually avoided income tax despite re-
tention of control.58
Into which category of cases does the custodianship logically fall?
Factually, the custodian is quite similar to the managing parent in the
brokerage account cases.59 If those decisions are followed, the income
of a custodianship seems clearly taxable to the minor and to no one
else.
Even if the brokerage account cases have lost some of their former
persuasion, it is suggested that the custodian's resemblance to a guardian,
rather than to a trustee, should result in taxation to the minor.
Basically, a grantor-trustee may prescribe his own ability to control the
property transferred, whereas a donor-custodian cannot. A custodian's
authority flows from legislative grant. Presumably, the legislature can
narrow the control of the custodian by subsequent enactment. Conse-
quently, although the custodian may today have a considerable measure
of control over the securities he holds, tomorrow he may be governed
1; 204 F. 2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1953).
",A. N. McQuown P-H 1953 T. C. Memo. Dec., ff 53,204 (1953).
Alexander v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1951).
R. E. Martin, P-H 1944 T. C. Memo. Dec., § 44,013 (1954) ; H. C. Priester,
33 B. T. A. 230 (1935), nonacq. XIV-2 Cum. Bull. 39.
" Clay H. Brock, 22 T. C. 284 (1954) ; Edward H. Heller, 41 B. T. A. 1020
(1940) ; Reginald Fincke, 39 B. T. A. 510 (1939) ; Herbert L. Dillon, 32 B. T. A.
1254 (1935); Emil Frank, 27 B. T. A. 1158 (1933).
" A number of family income-shifting cases have failed because of a finding
that no bona fide completed gift was made. See, e.g., Hilda M. Royce, 18 T. C.
761 (1952); Ludwig Bendix, 14 T. C. 681 (1950); Ralph R. Anderson, 5 T. C.
443 (1945) ; Weil v. Commissioner,, 82 F. 2d 561 (5th Cir. 1936).
'.Note 57 mipra.
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by the same rules that now apply to guardians. Further, since a donor-
guardian can apply income for the support of his minor children without
subjecting himself to taxation in his individual capacity, it seems that
a donor-custodian, also a creature of the legislature, should be subject
to a like rule.
Nevertheless, a conservative view must recognize the possibility that
the courts will hold that the coexistence of the ability to apply income
for support of dependents and legislatively granted control available
in a particular year require taxation of income to a donor-custodian in
that year, at least, under the statutory definition of gross income. Al-
though the Clifford6" and Douglas v. Willcuts6l doctrines have thus
far been limited to cases involving trusts, there is no assurance that
the future will not see their application to other types of transfers.
It can scarcely be contended that the present Supreme Court is of a
mind to restrict the meaning of "gross income." In a single day in
1955, the Court decided that both "insider profits" under the Securities
Exchange Act of 193462 and recoveries of treble damages under the
Federal anti-trust laws were within the scope of Section 22(a) of the
1939 Code.63
Unquestionably, the current uncertainty as to income tax conse-
quences will result in the deferring of many transfers that would other-
wise take place under the new law until the matter has been clarified by
ruling or decision. Nevertheless, it seems probable that a good many
parents will calculate the tax risk and will make gifts to their children
of income-producing securities, perhaps hedging their position to some
extent by naming a relative of the minor other than themselves as cus-
todian. A taxpayer who calculates the risk may find, in his own case,
that the figures are attractive. If the transfer is recognized for income
tax purposes, the income is shifted to the normally lower tax bracket
of the minor. Moreover, the child will continue to qualify as a de-
pendent regardless of the amount of income he receives so long as he is
under age 19, or over that age but still a "student." 64 If the income
of custodianship is taxed to the donor, he merely pays the tax he would
have been obligated to pay, plus interest. A sound middle ground is
available to a parent who desires to make a transfer for the benefit
of his child, not anticipating that the income will be made available for
support and maintenance prior to majority. Under Section 677 (b),
30 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
"1 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935).
0248 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78A (1952).
General American Investors Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 348 U. S. 434 (1955);
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Company, 348 U. S. 426 (1955).
" Section 151 (e) (1) (B), 1954 Code. Under the 1939 Code, Section
25 (b) (1) (D), exemption for a dependent was lost if his gross income for the
taxable year reached $600 or more.
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1954 Code, if the transfer is made in trust, income will not be taxable
to the grantor merely because such income may be applied for the sup-
port or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally obli-
gated to support, except to the extent that such income is so applied.
If, on the other hand, a parent with similar motives makes a transfer
to a custodian, and is held to be taxable on the income of the custodian-
ship by virtue of ability to apply income for support, presumably all of
the income of the custodianship would be taxable to the donor, even
though none had actually been applied to discharge of his obligation,
under the doctrine of Helvering v. Stuart.65
In at least one situation involving transfers for the support of
minors, a custodianship would appear to be currently preferable to a
trust, despite the unsettled state of tax law. Prior to the adoption of
the 1954 Code, a favorite arrangement saw a grandparent transferring
property to his son as trustee for the support and maintenance of the
grandchildren. It is quite probable that the son in such a situation is
now subject to taxation on that portion of the income of the trust
actually applied to the support of his minor children. Such would ap-
pear to result from the application of Section 678(c) of the 1954 Code,
which it has been suggested, may have crept into the Code by reason
of a misconception of prior case law.66
CONCLUSION
Whatever the ultimate result may be with respect to income taxa-
tion, the North Carolina Gift of Securities to Minors Law unquestion-
ably provides a much-needed degree of convenience in handling the
property of minors. If, in addition, a valid shifting of taxable income
results, the General Assembly will have indeed earned the plaudits of
countless Tar Heel fathers.
Or 317 W.S. 154 (1942), holding that a grantor is taxable on all trust income
which may be applied for the support of his minor children, although none is ifi
fact so applied.
"Winton, Taxation of Nongrantors under Trusts for Support of Their De-
pendents, 33 TAXES 804, 812 (1955). "It is by no means clear that if Congress had
understood the pre-existing law, it would have adopted subdivision (c) of Section
678. It is even less clear that Congress would have changed the pre-existing law
and made nongrantors taxable if its attention had been clearly drawn to the
problem."
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